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INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT, PROPRIETY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY
The Augustan poets had at their disposal a vast storehouse of philosophical vocabulary,
consimilar to their cache of both mythological and historical vocabularies. Vergil, for instance,
had incorporated much of both the prevailing Epicureanism and the impending Stoicism of his
age; the notion of philosophical appropriation in poetry as a defense against amphigory is
superabundant in the aesthetics of Horace’s Ars Poetica:
Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit et uarias inducere plumas
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatum admissi, risum teneatis, amici? i

It would not be a maggoty, vagarious extension of this perspective to maintain that the criterion of
both how philosophical propriety should be applied to some regimented vocabulary when utilized
for some poetical work and how its connection with the internal workings of nature were to be
espoused. Clear evidence that such an extension was actually made emerges from an examination
of Ovid's use of philosophical vocabulary. Ovid used at one time or another a wide range of
conflicting philosophical doctrines. But it is futile to suppose that Ovid espoused a philosophical
system. It would be much more fruitful to view each instance of philosophical vocabulary as
merely appropriate to the context in which it appears, recognizing that for Ovid the employment
of philosophical vocabulary is simply a premonitory, prognosticative integrant of poetic technique.
He resembled his Augustan predecessors also in that he did not restrict himself to the use
of any one philosophy, but used a variety of doctrines without making any attempt to establish any
consistency among them. In view of these facts it is here suggested that he had conceived of
philosophy not as a perennial search for truth, but rather as a collection of doctrines which could
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be effectively used on appropriate occasions. Philosophy would, below the Ovidian branch, cease
to embody an argumentative drive toward discovering such truths, of solving traditional
philosophical problems, instead becoming an expressive device, implying that there are problems
to be solved which are not simply problems about the best way of describing phenomena. From
the fact that there is no agreement about criteria for their solutions, it then appears as though
Ovid’s use of doctrines demonstrated that this is to be taken as signifying the difficulty of the
subject matter, and not, as Horace may have held, as a perversity of method. Ovid reveals most
clearly the purely expressive aspect of the philosophical process; while his predecessors surely
were much more seriously concerned with the saliency philosophical questions purported to
address the nature of things, Ovid’s poetics construed truth-talk in terms of the practices of
applying such-and-such a view given such-and-such a need.
In promulgating such an interpretation of Ovid’s works, it is important, first of all, to
examine his application of different philosophical doctrines in the service of meeting the propriety
conditions of discrepant mythological, narrative, or hermeneutic contexts, evaluating passages in
both his Metamorphoses as well as his love poems in order to – secondly – ascribe an anticipatory
pragmatic semanticist attitude to Ovid’s poetics; then it will be suggested that his semantic
pragmatism may ably amount to an eschewal of the somewhat naïve assumption that private
experience and one’s semantic expressions somehow connect to the objective presence of a static
world: a radicalized form of pragmatism about semantics, viz. pragmatic-expressivism.
1. EMPLOYING PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY
As with so many characters, situations, poses, and motives that had become conventional in
Roman love elegy, Ovid’s poetics adopt the conventional attitude towards philosophical
vocabulary, inverting it often to meet the needs of his different projects. Sole interest in the
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expressive aspect of philosophical vocabulary would’ve rendered Ovid’s appeal to an Epicurean
cosmogony as well as to the chaos-based cosmogony a sort of perverse contradiction to a poet like
Horace, for whom a rigid, robust truth was the goal of philosophical inquiry. In the case of the Ars
Amatoria, II, 468-70, one is confronted with a statement about the origin of the creation explained
in terms of the disposition of the three regions of the universe – the firmament with its nocturnal
flames, its earth, and its sea:
Unaque erat facies sidera, terra, fretum;
Mox caelum impositum terries, humus qequore cincta est,
Inque suas partes cessit inane chaos . . .

Ovid’s depiction of chaos as vacant suggests similarity with the Epicurean void, doctrinally held
to be itself inane. A conspicuous difference between this account of creation and that found in
Horace is that here the universe was formed by an intelligent mind. Furthermore, it is even more
significant that Ovid makes the move of attributing the softening of man’s hard nature to the
power of love, introducing an Epicurean story of creation in this work so to harness its expressive
purport for illustrating the power of love, and the mainstream contemporary Epicurean account for
the original process of softening in the development of human life was therefore very appropriate
to Ovid's theme. But only if the use of this sort of explanation is juxtaposed with another will the
criterion of propriety enable one to explain the expressive plurality of his poetics.
Another occurrence of the creation story is found within the opening lines of the
Metamorphoses, where Ovid is introducing the theme of the work, namely, alteration. In this
context he finds it appropriate to stress this process from an original undifferentiated chaos to a
universe of order and harmony. His animating idea begins with the forging of elemental
constellations by an ineffable force:
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Sic erat instabilis tellus, innabilis unda,
Lucis egens aer: nulli sua forma manebat ii

The apparent Epicurean view of permanent indestructible monadic components capable of
resisting transmutation is here abjured, whereas the furniture of the stoic world readily mutate into
one another is embraced; yet, although the doctrine of creation used by Ovid in the
Metamorphoses has been referred to for convenience as Stoicism, there is no reason to suppose
that Ovid abstained from blending the doctrines of various philosophical schools even within a
single passage – that is, if such combinations were orthogonal to his needs. There is evidence, for
instance, of some Lucretian and Empedoclean borrowings in the passage of the Metamorphoses
just discussed. (See Segal, 2001: 64-5, 67. Hardie, 1995: 204, 214).
A much clearer example of the Ovidian technique to unite within a single context the
vocabularies of varied doctrines may be found at Metamorphoses, XV, in the expounded doctrine
of Pythagoras – just as wax, he says, easily assumes new shapes, and does not preserve its form
unchanged, yet is actually the same thing, so the soul is always the same, but it passes into various
form. Soon after, howbeit, Ovid gives his readers the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of
souls. He extends the idea of change to include not merely souls, but all things whatever:
. . . nihil est toto, quod perstet, in orbe.
Cuncta fluunt, omnisque, vagans formatur imago.
Ipsa quoque adsiduo labuntur tempora motu,
non secus ac flumen.

This neo-Heraclitean bit of reasoning allowed Ovid to operate with the meta-philosophical
impetus which he had required for his critique of metaphysically saturated ontologies. This also
placed him in the position to assemble his critique of Augustan morality.
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Both his binary structuring of axiological pedagogy, on the one hand, and his amatory
themes, on the other, allowed his work to create an incongruous effect which immediately betrays
the notion of a moral purpose. Such a curious perversion occurs, for example, at Amores, III, 11,
where a contrast is made between a man’s devout discipline and the infidelity and deceit of a
mistress. He then proceeds to claim that the disciplined must avoid leisure. Hence it is safe to infer
that Ovid borrowed from the moralists certain precepts about the cure of love, and that by so doing
he could only be expected to lather his latter works with a pretense of serious moral purpose. This
moral pretense, however, is throughout contrasted with the author's obvious partiality toward the
passion he claims to be remedying. Or rather, he doesn’t claim to be attacking love generally. He
didn’t recant his treatment of love as an art, which is subject to the expressions of its practitioners,
but merely suggested the means of putting an end to a love that has become baneful and mentally
dissonant. Here, then, are two instances of Ovid's adaptation of incompatibility relations amongst
moral precepts to an end quite the opposite of that for which the philosophers of his day had
intended them; this incongruity of ends and means, this quasi-serious treatment of a light and
playful theme, does much to give his love poems a peculiar place within the pantheon of the great
prosodic and poetic achievements of antiquity, and it is also what gives them their pragmatic
quality.
2. OVID’ POETICS AND SEMANTIC PRAGMATISM
Today, so-called “semantic pragmatists” hold one or another kind of “dual aspect theory”
about the kind of sapient capability with which semantic contents intermingle. Roughly, these
sorts of theorists think that grasping such contents is a matter both of knowing how some
semantic-theoretic bit behaves during the process of inferring and also a matter of knowing how to
apply appropriate concepts to things in its extension. Having a concept of quadrilaterality means
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being able to do a little inferring (e.g., from quadrilaterality to shaped); and it's also being able to
do a little applying (e.g., of either quadrilaterality or ‘quadrilateral’ to objects in conditions that
are favorable for fitting the conditions of being a quadrilateral) – that is to say, semantic
pragmatism insists on the priority of pragmatics (a study of the ways linguistic expressions are
used) over semantics (a study of the sense and reference of linguistic expressions).
Semantic pragmatists, though multifarious in constitution, are usually believed to come in
either of two main varieties. First, some consequences of semantic pragmatism have motivated
some philosophers to conceive of the semantic pragmatist’s thesis as an eliminativist one.
Eliminativism is concerned with what its practitioners conceive as excess sentential and
representational phenomena. For example, on this view large sub-classes of statements taken to be
true are actually either systematically false or possess no cognitive content. The eliminativist
contrasts the false statements of some language L to the claims of outmoded scientific theories in
L, vouching for an elimination of those statements. But whereas the eliminativist compares the
false statements in question with the claims of contemporarily obsolete scientific hypotheses, a
second variety of semantic pragmatism – in part, because of a laxness concerning falsity in the
eliminativist sense – derives its animating inklings from the notion that, in some language, L1,
false sentences function better than their counterparts in terms of use; further, the practices of
making certain claims might be beneficial in some way, despite the fact that the claims concerned
aren’t literally true in L1. If so, semantic theorists need not commit to a quest for sentences,
propositions, or judgments constructed from bits of L1 which both bear truth and are true. But this
does not mean that the conventions of judging and talking in L1 should be abandoned: there are
uses for all manners of sentence-tokens, regardless of truth-value. These are the claims of
fictionalism. These rather iron-fisted semantic pragmatisms demand a comprehensive account of
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meaning in terms of use, whether in the name of either desuetude or preservation; so, perhaps the
best way of expressing the core idea of semantic pragmatism is not by way of ambiguous demands
of lexicological answerability to pragmatics, but by insisting that the fundamental semantic
conceptual data can be ably elaborated using pragmatic vocabulary. However, its feasibility
depends on what such a vocabulary would either look like or even how the use of its expressions
may be both itemized and characterized.
The connection between both Ovid’s poetics, to one side, and semantic pragmatism, to the
other, hinges upon both his and the fictionalists’ rejection of a two-pronged assumption about
language: (1) that it is a medium for encoding sentential packets of factual information and (2) that
these contents are all about some aspect of an objective, primarily inaccessible reality. Ovid’s
poetics suggest that his predecessors’ earlier poetics had implied an account which hinged upon a
bifurcation between (1) and (2), which retain (1) at the expense of (2). For this fails the poet and
oppresses the milky, educated denizens of first light. As his corpus suggests, it is, rather, a
pluralistic understanding of the role of content in any poet’s poeticizing – or, that some account of
concepts may be better off explaining those concepts’ use which begins “with a story about the
practice or activity of applying concepts, and elaborating on that basis an understanding of
conceptual content,” the sort of narrative that submits “an account of knowing . . . that such and
such is the case in terms of knowing how . . . to do something.” (Brandom, 2000: 4). These
endorsements, that both nature and experience are to be understood in terms of the processes by
which both relatively stable megagalaxies of habits arise and sustain themselves through their
interactions with an ecosphere inclusive of the moorings of conflicting habits and semantic truthproperties simply do not sanction naïve impositions of one’s aesthetic judgments upon the world.
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Indeed the line of thought is one which seems quite worthy for explicating the genus to which both
Ovid’s poetics, to one side, and semantic pragmatism, to the other, belong.
But Ovid’s poetics embody a radical third semantic-pragmatist thesis: “pragmaticexpressivism.” So construed, Ovid’s poetics parallel with the fictionalist point about semantics –
namely, that some of the statements within one’s background language will never to fill the brute
roll of matching objective facts while simultaneously standing in isomorphic relations of sense,
reference, and the like. Pragmatic-expressivists, however, hold that some of the utterances within
the background language taken to be statements aren’t genuine statements at all but have some
other point or function, whereby the roles played by the expressions within a wider framework of
linguistic praxis may be understood in a broadly functionalist vocabulary; while the fictionalist
distinguishes between the useful and the literal (or, real), a pragmatic-expressivist doesn’t feel the
need to concede the existence of the sense in which some statement in the background language
really impugns falsity. Taking some statement as false in this sense is to both commit a category
mistake while also exhibiting a failure to appreciate what Nussbaum (2007) cites Katy as
nominating the “feature-placing” aspect of language. (112).
A pragmatic-expressivist semantics is a sort of folk semantics – i.e. it endorses the notion that
there is no point in committing to our over-flung, ambitious, and albeit pretentious metaphysical
mistakes about language; this notion seems to account for Ovid’s explicit disregard for the
traditional notion of truth, particularly as correspondence. For it is in his works that the real world
and the world of myth cross in a way that he presumed had crossed in an age which antedated his
own, when real people got involved in real predicaments but acted in such a way as to provide a
standard for later generations. This is a crucial move for his pragmatism, taking the elegists’
conventional attitude towards mythology and inverting it, as in the following passage:
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nunc ego, quas habuit pinnas Danaeius heros,
terribili densum cum tulit angue caput,

nunc opto currum, de quo Cerealia primum
semina uenerunt in rude missa solum,
prodigiosa loquor, ueterum mendacia uatum:
nec tulit haec umquam nec feret ulla dies . . . iii

One of pragmatic-expressivism’s more extreme suggestions is that exegesis leads to a
reformulation of the relationship between appearance and interpretation along semantic pragmatist
lines, themselves relying upon what might be elaborated as a typological model of knowledge.
The following passage forces the reader into confronting an explicit examination of just who has
the right of appropriation, an issue pertinent to the study of the history of interpretation and myth –
things of great rapport for the Augustan poetic tradition:
et mea debuerat falso laudata uideri
femina; creduiitas nunc mihi uestra nocet. iv

This is typical of Ovid's cavalier attitude towards semantic-theoretic bits throughout the couplets
which comprise the Amores. It is not enough to imply that when it is convenient for one semantic
bit to be taken or treated as true, its truth status is thenceforth solidified – Ovid’s text does not at
all suggest that evaluative have the distinctive role that previous poets and philosophers had
supposed them to; both Ovid’s poetics and semantic pragmatism are suspicious of the bifurcation
between prescription and description, but whereas the semantic pragmatist of the status quo
defends certain intuitions about such a bifurcation Ovid’s poetics sternly denigrate them.
Ovid’s poetics attempted to neither exemplify nor preserve some manner of bifidity
between the poles of the prescriptive-descriptive divide, implying a subtler view about what
creatures who are decision-makers under uncertainty find it useful to tie their credences to a topic
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suitable for consensus do or express. Applying the technique of exegesis as a sort hermeneutical
via media, speakers then coordinate their credences. The objects of such ways of talking inherit
their properties from the functional task to which such talk gives expression. What is distinctive
about Ovid’s uses of philosophical modicums is that in place of the doldrums of the prescriptivedescriptive bifurcation his poetics demonstrate that a unitary account of assertoric form, an
account compatible with the idea that semantic expressions can be put to work in various and
distinct ways, is more than mere apocryphal possibility.
There are two reasons for optimism about this aspect of Ovid’s poetics. The first is that it
doesn’t seem too litigious about assertion’s functioning as an apparatus of coordination, having
only to invert the order of explanation between practice and semantic content, as when he
describes the bedraggled state of his mistress at Book I, lines 11-18 of his Amores. But since his
inversion lurks at a subterranean level, it does not follow that it greatly impacts one’s notion of
probability. Another, second, ground for optimism is the alignment of Ovid with what I take to be
the most beneficial contemporary proposal for saying something substantial about the assertoric
tournure of phenomenal content, as when his semantics seems so perverted as not to fit into
context:
sic nisi uittatis quod erat, Cassandra, capillis,
procubuit templo, casa Minerua, tuo.

Although Cassandra is rendered by Vergil with loose hair, Ovid chooses to describe her with her
“priestly fillet” in place for no other reason than to render his own simile inappropriate, in order to
make a joke out of the use of semantic exemplifications of any sort: an expression of mere child’s
play, to be sure. Ovid does not need to make any metaphysically scrupulous ontological
commitments concerning the range of quantifiers over purported semantic (predicate)
extensionality (as in this case regards Cassandra).
12
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3. CONSEQUENCES FOR A MODAL SEMANTICS OF EXISTENCE
A related issue in the metaphysics of modality, involving some specific troubles with
(modal) intuitions about both modal and natural language vocabularies, centers on a particular
existential semantic conundrum; the conundrum itself rests upon the following argumentative
structure: (P1) it is necessary that X is F; (P2) it is possible that X is non-existent; () it is possible
that both X is F and X is non-existent. What seems most peculiar about this argument is that it is
indeed sound, but is abhorrently irascible; while there have been several attempts on the part of
metaphysicians to resolve this issue, semantic pragmatist literature makes possible a semantic
resolution which nullifies any metaphysical need.
Two sorts of semantic responses have been proffered in order to meet the challenge headon. The first case parallels the eliminativist position mentioned earlier. The proposal is that
propositions concerning an object are neither true nor false if that object does not actually exist.
According to this response, the paradoxical argument equivocates between a strong and a weak
reading of modal necessity. In the strong sense, necessity amounts to truth come what may; in the
weak sense, necessity is falsity come what not may. (P1) is only true in the latter sense, but (P2) is
only true given an equivocally strong sense of the modal operator. So the argument, according to
this particular semantic pragmatist response, is invalid. The second response assumes bivalence
but distinguishes a genuine from a disingenuous sense of necessity. A proposition is necessary in
the disingenuous sense iff it is true in all contexts (research programs). Relatedly, some
proposition the intentional extension of which contains certain objects will be necessary in the
genuine sense iff true in all contexts (research programs) in which such objects exist. The
argument equivocates between the two senses along fictionalist lines. For (P1) is true only in the
genuine sense, while (P2) is true only in the disingenuous sense. Neither of these responses seems
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prima facie adequate in meeting the challenge: they rely upon implausible bifurcation theses.
Nevertheless, a proper diagnosis must be semantic, as opposed to metaphysical.
A technical issue for an unmodified bivalent approach is that if one were to spell out
semantic rules for operators expressing the qualified senses of necessity and possibility, these
rules would have to make reference to the internal structure of sentences on which the operators
play their roles. The idea is that when internal propositional contents concern certain objects, the
value of the necessitation of some proposition hinges upon such objects. In orthodox lexeme
semantics, propositions expressed with rigid expressions of reference will be determined as a
function of the individuals to which those expressions refer, but the individuals will not be
constituents of the proposition determined. Giving compositional rules for the genuine senses of
necessity and possibility would require better elaborated propositions and new rules for all of the
connectives and operators to ensure that the new values for the sentences were a function of the
values of their components.
Ancillary issues center on a lateral theoretical crease. On the one hand, the explanation of
the genuine sense of necessity seems to imply that it is necessary that X exists. But it seems
implausible to suggest that there is any sense of necessity in which X exists necessarily. On the
other, the second response seems unsuccessful when it comes to accounting for adequate reasons
for supposing that (P1) is not to be accepted, under the disingenuous reading of necessity. On the
first of the two semantic pragmatist responses, every sentence containing non-designators, without
qualification, can be expected to fail to be true, while for the second, some sentences with names
that don’t designate will be true in a weak sense; so, even if X exists contingently, there are truths
about X that are necessary in the disingenuous sense. Since this second response allows for some
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predicates that do not imply existence, it needs an explanation for why the predicate of (P1) does:
certain biological and chemical properties are, after all, definitive.
But this sort of issue cannot stick to a modified version of the second semantic pragmatist
response, because such a modified version of some bivalent semantics may not be committed to
any metaphysical bifurcation thesis about both the genuine and the disingenuous as applied to
predicates. For the relevant distinction, given some modified second response, is between
predicates and sentences, not between predicates and qualia. In some general semantics for a
bivalent language, all predication sentences imply existence; so, those sentences are false when
any of the singular terms to which the predicate is applied fail to have any nominata. Such a
semantics would have complex as well as simple predicates, but if one’s semantics allows for
singular terms which fail to nominate, come what may, then one must distinguish predications
with complex predicates from complex sentences with parts that are predications. For example, a
bifurcation may be necessary between ‘it is not the case that X is F’ and the case of X not being F.
This sort of bifurcation neither involves focusing on nor even fabricating a distinction
between the predicates as such, but on the notion of ‘it is not the case that’ as being a sort of
sentential operator  which isn’t an integrant of the complex predicate. Furthermore, the claim that
it is not the case that X is F amounts not to an application of the some predicate to X: it amounts to
a rejection of a sentence that purports to ascribe property F to X; so, judgments of truth-value
equivocate if F and ~F are substituted for one another within relevant sentence-pairings. Neither F
nor ~F, then, need be assigned priority, particularly in order to distinguish between tokenings of
either ‘X is F’ or ‘X is ~F’ from those of either ‘(X is F)’ or ‘(X is ~F)’.v
So, on the modified thesis, one may get by with a vocabulary which combines two
conceptually distinct semantic operations within the scope of one robust operator. But when the
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language is enriched in various ways, and restrictive existential presuppositions are relaxed, there
are other uses for complex predicates, and it is in any case conceptually clearer and more
perspicuous to segregate the jobs that are fused in quantifiers. What is needed is one operator that
forms a complex predicate from an open sentence which expresses a propositional function, with a
separate mechanism for expressing the predicate on which it is operant applies to objects within
the domain. If X is predicated as either F or ~F then every object satisfies it simply by having a
way of generalizing that to which the predicate in question is applied. In this traditionally
expressivist semantic mode there is no suppositious metaphysical posturing; the correct diagnosis
is not based on separating genuine necessity and possibility from disingenuous necessity and
possibility, both of each operating upon sentential items: the correct move to make does seem,
however, to involve rejecting (P1).
But even this modified thesis, too, runs into some trouble. For example, in property-talk,
one must concede the essential existence of X, since X has the property of necessary existence.
But this just seems like an example of the semantic-metaphysic conflation that the pragmaticexpressivist seeks to avoid. According to a pragmatic-expressivist semantics, by the lights of
which any view that adopts such talk is to be eschewed, both quantificational vocabulary
construction and its accompanying semantics say “what it is to do” in a perspicuous manner what
it is when one is saying something of something else. (Brandom, 2008). In other words, the trouble
lurks in both semantics and pragmatics, just not in any rigid metaphysical exploitation of both
categories. Similarly with Ovid’s poetics and the case of philosophical vocabulary, the idea is to
accommodate certain modal intuitions expressed in a natural language, citing the importance of
the use of those modal intuitions, about how notions of such use may explain the semanticmetaphysic hybridization.
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Restrictions placed upon the pragmatic-expressivist in linguistic practice differs depending
upon whether or not there is explicit mention of existence. It is a familiar observation that to say of
triangular prisms that they exist is not naturally understood as predicating existence of triangular
prisms. In the quantificational mode, sentence-tokens like ‘All X’s exist’ are peculiar because they
make a conflicting set of demands upon what one’s pragmatic suppositions must require. So there
is plenty of precedent for the quantificational claims when the predicate involved is the existence
predicate, for that predicate seems to fuse quantifiers in an awkward way. The role of these
pragmatic suppositions in reasoning, and the way they interact with modals, predication, and
existence claims rest upon the successes of a detailed explanation for the intuitive phenomena that
lie behind the tensions of an ordinary modal semantics of existence.
CONCLUSION
Horace and Vergil, surely, were much more seriously concerned with traditional
philosophical inquiry than Ovid, and for that reason their technique is less transparent. Yet the fact
that they developed a method for utilizing to the fullest advantage their rich philosophical heritage
is one of the utmost importance; for the skilful combination of philosophical doctrine with
mythological accounts characteristic of Ovid seems to have been committed to the idea that
eschewing certain philosophical locutions and problemata would not so much as lead to a
perspicuous philosophical quietism, but a rigid metaphysical quietism.
This exercise has centered upon the proposal that Ovid’s poetics are still capable of leading
anyone through the muck of certain hermeneutic conventions, providing the required nitty-gritties
whence any assertoric account of phenomenal content may generate. It has been the assumption of
the writer that this starting point offers a framework for speculation upon where, and how, words
lead discursive beings both to and fro the world. Ovid demonstrated that one need not devalue
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one’s philosophical locutions and dispositions, but revalue those very locutions and dispositions,
thereby possibly creating a more novel living way of life. Moreover, Ovidian poetics qua works of
the poet himself emphasize the indistinguishable normative impetus of linguistic praxis, which is
to claim that almost everything sapient creatures do is governed by rules or norms, whether or not
maintained by power relations. Performances of linguistic creatures may either be done in
consonance with appropriate rules or in conflict with such rules: the order of pragmatics to which
semantics is answerable must be supposed normative; it cannot constrain the values which
comprise its vocabulary to purely descriptive semantic-theoretic bits and provide an account of
linguistic praxis as a Wittgensteinian activity of making various noises given Pavlovian
circumstances.
Whatever constraint of this brood is endorsed, the pragmatic-expressivist may act with
Ovid in implying that an endorsement assumes the invisibility of rather artful semantic rubrics of
‘meaning’, ‘assertion’, ‘belief’, and ‘intention’ (Brandom, 2002: 49). However, if pragmatics
which is supposed to explain semantic properties of our linguistic expressions cannot be confined,
even at the most basic level, to an account of our linguistic practice in terms of various noises
made, but rather from the very beginning has to construe those noises as claims or assertions that
are in given circumstances appropriately or inappropriately made then one seems to both elaborate
and characterize those assertions from the very beginning in terms of their semantic properties. If
this is indeed so, then the very idea of semantic pragmatism is erroneous. But this is where Ovid’s
works must be taken more seriously, particularly as philosophy in the guise of poetry.
Pragmatic-expressivist semantic theories must engage the problems which normativity
poses this semantic pragmatist phylum – e.g. it is one thing to provide such an explanation, and
quite another one to give an account of speech acts and their correctness in non-semantic terms;
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yet, none the less, even if cognitive phenomena, for example, were extremely common and
unquestionable, explanations in cognitive economy would merely support the idea of mutual
interdependence between semantics and pragmatics, that is, their unavoidable entanglement,
though it seems that in order to realize this ambition the strongest forms of semantic pragmatism –
eliminativism and fictionalism – require something more than their pragmatic-expressivist
brethren do, namely the most robust of explanatory reductions of semantics to pragmatics. Ovidian
meditations may do philosophers a whole host of good on the semantic front, because in
commonplace metaphysical packages some conceptions must be more basic than others, some
views must underpin and support other views, and not the other way round: that is why the biased
metaphysical analyses of pragmatics must be hemmed; it is why analyses of meaning and
reference must be removed from the metaphysical assumptions of either truth-conduction or
answerability. There is much more for today’s pragmatists to do, let alone say, with regard to the
anthropy of lexemic potables.
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